Reform, Recovery, and Growth: Latin America and the Middle East by Rudiger Dornbusch
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Reform, Recovery, and Growth: Latin America and the Middle
East
Volume Author/Editor: Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds.
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-15745-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/dorn95-1
Conference Date: December 17-18, 1992
Publication Date: January 1995
Chapter Title: Progress Report on Argentina
Chapter Author: Rudiger Dornbusch
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7657
Chapter pages in book: (p. 223 - 238)7  Progress Report on Argentina 
Rudiger Dornbusch 
7.1  Introduction 
Argentina, it used to be said, has problems: the money is outside and the 
unions are inside; the unions are British and the taxpayers Italian. Half a year 
ago one might have believed that all this was changing. The money had been 
coming back at a rapid pace, the unions had moved off the stage, and the tax 
system was showing a rapid improvement in yield. On courageous reform, 
Argentina was moving far ahead of  Italy. Unfortunately, today Argentina is 
once again under the shadow of financial instability, though decidedly not on 
the ropes. Acute overvaluation, melting of confidence, questions about the sus- 
tainability of reforms are all back. Today the questions are how much of the 
recent progress can be carried forward and how best to defuse the currency 
crisis. 
The economic reforms are less than two years old, started in April 1991 in 
the aftermath of the most recent hyperinflation. From hyperinflation, the rate 
of price increase has been brought down to a modest 15-20%  per year. Perva- 
sive reform in the economy, ranging from deregulation  and privatization to 
trade opening, has raised productivity and helped reduce budget deficits. A 
radical and broad-based attack on poor fiscal performance is gradually show- 
ing results in increased tax collection and containment of spending. All of that 
is only a beginning, and the effort will have to continue for years. For a moment 
the payoff was phenomenal: growth returned at an astounding pace and with it 
confidence that Argentina can make it. The return of confidence is the most 
gratifying reward: Argentines have traditionally been highly contemptuous of 
their country’s economy and cynical beyond belief. Today they keep their heads 
high even though they once again are worrying about their currency. 
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Argentina has not yet escaped from its most traditional  problem,  already 
described a century ago in 1899 in the Banker5 Magazine (quoted by Cardoso 
1987): “They are always in trouble about their currency. Either it is too good 
for home use, or as frequently  happens, it is too bad  for foreign exchange. 
Generally, they have too much of it, but their own idea is that they never have 
enough. . . . The Argentineans alter their currency almost as frequently as they 
change presidents.. . . No people in the world take a keener interest in cur- 
rency experiments than the Argentineans.” 
Only a year ago, there was the prospect that a century of instability would 
be put behind and a golden age would open up for Argentina.’ Not implaus- 
ible, but it will take persistent, hard work, and at this time the prospects are 
unclear. 
7.2  Looking Back 
At the beginning of the century, Argentina was among the most prosperous 
countries in the world. It is not true that Argentina had an income level equal 
to that of  the United States or the leading country, Britain-in  fact, as table 
7.1 shows, Argentine per capita income was more nearly half the U.S. level. 
Argentina is often compared to Australia-both  are resource rich and were 
among the ten most prosperous regions at the beginning of the century. Again, 
Australia already had almost twice the level of per capita income that Argen- 
tina showed. Interestingly, Italy closely matched Argentina at the outset of the 
century and in 1950. 
Even so, Argentina was one of the very rich countries in the world and de- 
served a weekly report in the Economist. The country had made it when the 
invention of the Libby process made it possible to conserve meat and thus bring 
Argentine beef to the world market. The end of the past century, including the 
move to the gold standard in the  1890s which stabilized the currency, marked 
the dramatic ascent of Argentina to world-class performance. 
What did Argentina look like then? Here is a contemporary description by 
Hyndman in 1892. 
Buenos Aires  surpassed every  other city in  its luxury, extravagance,  and 
wholesale squandering of wealth. There was literally no limit to the excesses 
of the wealthier classes. While money, luxuries, and material poured in on 
the  one  hand,  crowds  of  immiserization  from  Italy  and  other  countries 
flocked in to perpetuate  the prosperity of  the new Eldorado of the South, 
Railways, docks, tramways, waterworks, gas-works, public building, man- 
sions, all were being carried on at once in hot haste. (89) 
Over the past eighty years much  if  not most of that status has been lost. 
Argentine per capita growth has been dismal, lower even than that of Britain. 
I. Cavallo ( 1984) enunciated a new growth paradigm for Argentina already in the 1980s. 225  Progress Report on Argentina 
Table 7.1  Per Capita GDP (U.S. 1913 = 100) 
Growth, 
1913  1950  1987  1900-87 
Argentina  47  62  88  1.1 
Brazil  14  28  91  2.4 
Australia  90  116  253  1.4 
United Kingdom  81  106  243  1.4 
United States  100  178  359  1.8 
Japan  21  30  259  3.1 
Italy  47  62  239  2.2 
Source: Maddison (1982). 
What went wrong in this century? First, in the interwar period, the Depression 
hit Argentina extra hard. Having built a fortune on a very open economy ori- 
ented toward exports of  agricultural commodities-wheat  and beef-protec- 
tion in industrial countries and the collapse of world trade and of prices had a 
devastating impact. Even so, the country maintained its international credit by 
steadfast adherence to debt service and internationalism. 
Protection of  manufacturing  and the building up of a sheltered industrial 
sector was the common response of Latin America to the 1930s crisis in world 
trade. The strategy worked at the outset to create employment and dampen the 
Depression. Moreover, World War I1 filled the coffers with reserves  and al- 
lowed the strategy to be carried forward for a while. But Peron was too much- 
a  nationalist-populist  policy  of  protection,  regulation,  and  macroeconomic 
instability  increasingly brought  down growth and prosperity  and  ultimately 
destroyed macroeconomic stability. Inflation became endemic, deficits became 
structural, and the country fell into cycles of populism and stabilization. 
The 1960s were the last cycle of expansion, and since then there has been 
only bad news: dictatorships and a “dirty war” on domestic dissent and guerril- 
las, a mad war on Britain over the Malvinas, massive capital flight, and a few 
hyperinflations. Raped over and over again, Argentina ultimately fell into full 
and complete disillusionment. By 1991 the economy was almost completely 
dollarized, and a massive part of wealth had moved abroad. 
In the 1980s the debt crisis was particularly severe. Having financed massive 
capital flight in 1978-82 by borrowing abroad, the country had no way of fac- 
ing the large debt service burdens that emerged with the end of voluntary lend- 
ing, world recession, and record high dollar interest rates in the early 1980s. 
Net investment has been negative for almost a decade, and real income has 
been falling (see fig. 7.1). A once great country had been run down to the point 
where millions of people in Buenos Aires were fed at soup kitchens. Real GDP 
per capita was back to the level of the early 1960s. 226  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Table 7.2  Long-Term Performance (%) 
1960-80  1980-90 
Growth per capita  1.8  -2.3 
Investment/GNP  22.0  13.6 
Inflation  71.7  440.0 
Table 7.3  Current Indicators 
1989  1990  1991  199P 
Inflation  5,386  800  56  15 
Public debth  79,377  74,832  75,048 
External  50,532  48,300  49,007 
Trade balanceh  5,376  8,189  4,406  -1,000 
Budgeth  ~  1,883  -333  -  1,107 
Revenue  7,073  10,345  15,334 
Expenditure  8,956  10,679  16,441 
Real wage‘  68  66  73  76 
Real exchange rated  170  122  75  65 
Industrial production‘  90  86  96  120 
”April 1992. 
hMillion  US$. 
‘1986 = 100. 
d1976 = 100. 
‘1988 = 100. 
7.3  The Menem-Cavallo Miracle2 
In March  1991, following yet  another burst of  extreme inflation (see fig. 
7.2), the country moved to a radical stabilization. The program was centered 
on the “convertibility plan.” Under this plan the government guaranteed the 
convertibility of pesos at a fixed exchange rate into U.S.  dollars and undertook 
not to print any money except in the course of  buying dollars in the foreign 
exchange market. Since foreign exchange reserves in the central bank exceeded 
the dollar value of  the domestic money supply, the program was “credible” 
provided the government stuck to the constitutional commitment not to print 
money to finance the budget. 
So far, for more than a year, the promises have been kept. The currency has 
become strong in the sense that there has been a major rebuilding of monetary 
assets in the form of peso currency holdings and bank deposits. Moreover, the 
government has initiated sweeping economic reforms. 
Privatization  is proceeding at breakneck speed. Without much regard for 
2. See de Pablo (1992); Cline (1992); table 7.3 in this chapter. 227  Progress Report on Argentina 
Fig. 7.1  Argentine per capita GDP (index 1980 = 100) 
Fig. 7.2  Twelve-month inflation rate (percentage  per month) 
getting “good” or “fair” prices, the government is selling enterprises from oil 
to steel, from airlines to military production facilities (see Petrecolla, Porto, 
and Gerchunoff 1992). The key recognition is that the public sector enterprises 
make up much of  the deficit; the sooner they pass out of  public hands, the 
sooner there is a chance to balance the budget. 
Deregulation is pervasive. A while back, restrictions on economic activity 
abounded. Hours for  shops, licensing, permits, prohibitions wherever one 
looked. In one sweeping piece of  legislation the government cleaned out an 
entire range of impediments to productivity. 
Trade liberalization has been pushed aggressively and is seen as a key build- 
ing block in more rational and productive use of the national resources. Access 
to cheaper and better intermediate goods has started lowering production costs 
and raising international competitiveness. More broadly, in manufacturing, in- 
ternational competition that  comes with  trade  opening has  started to exert 
price discipline. 228  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Beyond unilateral  trade  liberalization,  the  ongoing  effort to  construct  a 
MERCOSUR free trade area complements the trade ~trategy.~ 
Fiscal  reform is equally ambitious, although progress  is inevitably  only 
gradual. The enforcement of tax laws has been stepped up dramatically, taxa- 
tion has been simplified, and the tax yield is up. Between 1989 and 1991 the 
real (in U.S. dollars) revenue from taxation doubled! 
Institutional reform is being implemented in the social security system, with 
a major impact on the budget, national saving, and the labor market. 
Injution has been  brought  down  dramatically  and  possibly  on a lasting 
basis. 
Discarding entirely a leftish, nationalist perspective, the country has been 
thrown open to foreign investment in the asset markets and in the area of di- 
rect investment. 
The country has normalized relations with the rest of the world. Politically, 
an understanding has been reached with Britain. In the Gulf War, Argentina 
was among the first to commit troops. In the economic area a quiet and respon- 
sible Brady debt relief plan secured access to International  Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank funding. 
Most important,  democrucy is  firmly established,  and  the  possibility  of 
putsches or other adventures is just not part of the scene. 
All of  this is splendid. If  kept up and pushed further, year after year, the 
reform program cannot fail to give Argentina the same stability that Chile or 
Mexico have secured from a decade of adjustment. For the time being, the 
willingness to do more is strong, and the program and the government com- 
mand wide support. 
The external environment has been immensely favorable in supporting the 
reforms with capital inflows and hence support for what otherwise might have 
been a fledging currency. The external support derived in part from the decline 
in alternative yields in developed ec~nomies.~  But in large measure, restored 
access to the world capital market derived from the receptivenss of the world 
capital market to “reform economies”-Chile  and Mexico had paved the way. 
There is certainly something to the view that either a developing country gets 
too much capital from abroad or too little, but rarely the middle ground. Taus- 
sig (1928, 130) long ago remarked on this fact: “The loans from creditor coun- 
tries . . . begin with a modest amount, then increase and proceed crescendo. 
They are likely to be made in exceptionally large amounts toward the culminat- 
ing stage of a period of activity and speculative upswing, and during that stage 
become larger from month to month so long as the upswing continues. With 
the advent of crisis, they are at once drawn down sharply, even cease entirely.” 
3. The recent  imposition of  import  duties,  prompted  by  Brazil’s  “excess competitiveness,” 
4. On this argument see Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhardt (1992). Hanson (1992) reviews the 
clearly represents a setback in progress toward regional liberalization. 
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Of course, there are areas of vulnerability. The picture would not be com- 
plete without talking of three acute problems. 
Fiscal correction notwithstanding, the budget continues to be in deficit. Over 
time there will be further improvement, but for now the deficit is lowered by 
privatization income, which will not be permanent. The financing by external 
credit helps financial stability, but ultimately is not sustainable. Hence, a first 
clear message: far more must be done with the budget to secure a very comfort- 
able position of equilibrium without extraordinary revenues or special financ- 
ing. That point is widely understood and may happen. 
Competitiveness is a serious issue. Over the past year, on a fixed exchange 
rate but with inflation of  20%, competitiveness has been eroded. Wholesale 
prices in dollars are very high relative to levels of the mid-1980s. Some real 
appreciation is warranted by the fact that Argentina is now  a stabilizing or 
even almost stable country, but too much real appreciation threatens stability 
because it suggests that the convertibility plan might fail. 
External debt remains an issue. The public debt amounts to $61 billion, in- 
cluding a sizable portion of arrears. The financing of debt service either re- 
quires foreign private capital flows or else a large trade surplus. Both are in 
question. The resource transfer problem therefore remains acute.5 
All is well while growth proceeds at a fast pace. But does Argentina’s politi- 
cal and economic miracle have the stamina to go through a few hard years? A 
look at the reforms will give a better basis to judge that question. 
7.4  Fiscal Reform 
Correcting the budget deficit is a critical step in establishing financial stabil- 
ity. Any deficit financed by money creation is bound to be inflationary. The 
fact that the economy is substantially demonetized translates even quite small 
deficits into extremely large inflation rates (see Rodriquez 1992). 
Only a few years ago, Argentines would have thought that paying taxes was 
a serious mistake, There were no sanctions; the government was in disgrace. 
The public did not get “their money’s worth.” Public finance is on the way to 
major improvement. Efficiency in government is derived by layoffs, privatiza- 
tion, and accountability. The budget is being nudged toward balance. Macro- 
economic performance as a result is better and certainly more stable, and the 
chances for growth are enhanced. 
Part of the fiscal improvement can be attributed to privatization. In 1990-92 
the government derived $4 billion in cash revenue and achieved debt reduction 
by conversion in the amount of $7,343 (Salomon Brothers  1992). Of course, 
the benefit of  privatization  is  not  measured  exclusively  by  these  numbers. 
There is typically an accompanying deficit reduction because the public sector 
is a major source of deficits. Moreover, privatization brings a chance of invest- 
5. See United Nations, CEPAL (1992) on the historical pattern of these transfers. 230  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Table 7.4  Public Finance 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991’  1992b 
~~~  ~ 
Overall balance  -7.9  -4.1  -6.5  -7.0  -21.8  -3.3  -1.8  -0.4 
Tax revenue  18.6  18.5  17.8  16.8  16.3  16.6  19.1  20.9 
Primary balance  0.7  1.8  -0.9  -1.0  -0.4  2.2  2.4  2.2 
Interest  5.9  4.3  4.7  5.4  15.6  4.5  3.7  2.2 
quasi-Fiscal 
Nonfinancial Public Sector 
Central Bank 
Deficit  -2.8  -1.6  -0.9  -0.7  -5.9  -1.0  -0.6 
Central government 
Revenues  11.3  11.8  10.9  9.2  9.8  9.6  14.2 
Primary balance  3.2  3.2  2.2  0.8  1.5  2.6  3.7 
‘Preliminary. 
bInternational Monetary Fund program. 
ment by a party that faces less financial constraint than the government. This 
ought to translate into a reduction  of bottlenecks,  improved technology,  and 
ultimately a better supply response. 
Beyond privatization, reform of the social security system is a key priority 
of reform. The number of recipients  exceeds the number of sixty-year-olds; 
the ratio of recipients to the supporting labor force is extravagant. Reforms are 
now passing the Congress and are likely to improve both the budget and the 
real income of  qualified recipients.  In the process Argentina  will move to a 
more realistic retirement age-sixty-five  years, instead of the present sixty. 
Another critical area of fiscal reform involves revenue sharing and sharing 
of  spending responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments. 
The early attempt at fiscal federalism invariably involves a major transfer of 
revenues  of the provinces  without  an equivalent  transfer  of  burdens.  In the 
correction phase now under way the center recovers revenues and increasingly 
shifts responsibilities to the provinces. 
7.5  Trade Opening 
In the 1930s Argentina became a highly protected  economy. An extreme 
example of the impact of such protection  is that the Ford Falcon, produced 
with  1960s US. secondhand machinery,  kept being produced  in Argentina 
right up to 1990. But that is not the only example. Throughout manufacturing 
costs were high, quality was poor, models were obsolete, and all this was main- 
tained by  a tight regime of protection. Tariffs and quotas were the rule. And 
when, as often happened, the exchange rate was overvalued, the impact on 
imports was not extreme because protection was so fierce. 
Over the past two decades, but notably in the last few years, Argentina has 
moved sharply in the direction of trade liberalization. Quotas have been largely 231  Progress Report on Argentina 
Table 7.5  Average Tariff Rates (%) 
1976  1980  1989  1991 
55.9  27.8  23.8  9.4 
Source: GATT (1992). 
Table 7.6  Protective Duties by Category 
Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Total  12.2  7.3 
Raw materials  6.5  3.1 
Semimanufactures  10.3  5.8 
Finished goods  14.  I  7.7 
5  35 
5  22 
5  22 
5  35 
Source: GATT (1992). 
Table 7.7  Effective Tariff Rate, 1991 
Tariff & 
Tariff Only  Tariff-Type Measures 
Mean  12.4  28.2 
Standard deviation  4.1  8.1 
Minimum  -1.7  0 
Maximum  32.3  52.0 
Source: GATT (1992). 
Table 7.8  Balance of Payments 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992" 
______ 
Trade balance  3,8 13  5,379  8,274  3,879  -402 
Exports  9,135  9,579  12,353  11,972  7,5 18 
Imports  5,322  4,200  4,079  8,093  8,275 
Current account  -  1,572  -  1,305  1,903  -2,500 
Source: Banco Central Republica Argentina; International Monetary Fund: International Finan- 
cial Statistics. 
&January  to July, not annualized. 
eliminated, and tariff rates have come down both in level and, perhaps even 
more important, in their dispersion. 
Trade opening, the boom of 1991-92,  and the overvaluation (discussed be- 
low) combined to worsen sharply the external balance. Argentina had a tradi- 
tion of  trade surpluses.  In the past thirty  years, with the exception of  1975, 
there was never a deficit. This time the deficit will be large-$1  billion  or 
more. Moreover, the shift in the trade balance is nothing short of huge. Aware- 232  Rudiger Dornbusch 
ness of this growing trade problem and the accompanying question of how this 
might be financed if foreign capital inflows taper off is the basis for the confi- 
dence crisis that is now emerging. 
It might be thought that the trade deficit is benign in that it reflects a high 
component of capital goods imports-a  reflection  of modernization  and no 
risk since ultimately the expanded capacity pays its own dividends. In fact, 
however, capital goods imports doubled since 1989. But consumer goods in- 
creased more than fourfold and intermediates also doubled. It is clear that pro- 
tection held back imports and that now the liberalization, the boom, and the 
exchange rate all combine to yield a 1979-Chile-style blowup of the external 
balance. 
7.6  Overvaluation 
A simple model helps formulate the problem of currency appreciation.6 Let 
P,  and E be the log level of prices, wages, and the exchange rate. Lowercase 
letters stand for their rates of change with T,  the rate of inflation. The unem- 
ployment rate (or the GDP gap) is represented by y. 
(1)  IT  = (1 -  a)  (w -  IT) + a(e -  T) 
(2)  w=Tr-uy 
(3)  y  = 8(i* + e + A -  T)  -  A(E -  P) +f 
(4)  CA = k(E -  P) + v(i* + A + e -  T)  + pf 
i*  and  i are foreign and home interest rates and A denotes the political risk 
premium. Fiscal restraint is denoted byJ; and the current account surplus is 
denoted by CA. 
Equation (1) represents a standard accelerationist pricing equation: inflation 
has inertia.’ Deceleration is possible only if wage inflation or the rate currency 
depreciation can be brought down below the prevailing rate of inflation. Equa- 
tion (2) describes wage inflation. The rate of increase of  wages, because of 
explicit or implicit indexation, is equal to the rate of inflation but with an ad- 
justment for cyclical conditions. In ike third equation the unemployment rate 
is determined by real interest rates and by the level of competitiveness. 
Figure 7.3 shows the phase diagram of this model, using equation (3) and 
the combination of (1) and (2): 
(5)  IT  = y(e -  T)  + (1 -  a)  A (E -  P) -  (1 -  a)O(i* + A); 
y = [a  -  (1 -  .-)el. 
6. See also Dombusch (1979); Rodriguez (1982); Dombusch and de Pablo (1990); Edwards 
7. On the disinflation problem see Calvo (1983); Chadha, Masson, and Meredith (1992); Dom- 
(1989). 
busch and Fischer (1992); Edwards and Montiel (1989); V6gh (1992). 233  Progress Report on Argentina 
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Fig. 7.3  Phase diagram of the currency model 
The diagram is drawn for a given rate of depreciation e,, and it is assumed that 
the term y is positive. 
Consider now a program of  disinflation. Starting in a steady state at point 
A, the government reduces the rate of  depreciation to zero and sustains the 
now fixed exchange rate. The new long-run equilibrium is at point B, where 
inflation has come down to zero. 
The immediate impact of the rate fixing is to cut nominal interest rates and 
hence the real interest rate so that demand increases (see fig. 7.4). Higher de- 
mand and the elimination next lead to real appreciation. The instant rise in the 
level of demand, output, and employment gradually wears off. Ultimately the 
loss in competitiveness returns the economy to normal levels of  output and 
then creates a recession. The economy will return to full equilibrium, with 
reduced inflation, only after deflation has restored the initial level of competi- 
tiveness. Protracted unemployment is the rule. Moreover, in the early phases 
of the adjustment program, the current account turns toward deficit. 
The model is oversimplified in a number of respects. First, there are no large 
movements in the adjustment of demand and the current account to changes in 
the  real  exchange  rate.  In  addition,  the  adjustment  to real  exchange  rate 
changes assumes an immediate dominance of substitution effects, contrary to 
the Diaz-Alejandro hypothesis. Second, the monetary mechanism operates en- 
tirely through interest rates, and there is no special role for credit or confi- 
dence. Third, wealth effects and asset process play no role. But even though 
these aspects of the adjustment process are absent, the highly stylized model 
captures the patterns of the adjustment process. It highlights in particular that, 
on the way to full disinflation, high unemployment and large deficits constitute 
major confidence blocks to the continuation of the program. And if confidence 
does break down, so does the financing of external imbalances. Interest rates 
will soar, output will fall faster, and ultimately the program will be abandoned. 
Argentina today is in a situation of currency overvaluation. Table 7.9 shows 
the extreme increase of the Argentine CPI measured in U.S. dollars. The ques- 234  Rudiger Dornbusch 
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Fig. 7.4  The impact of rate fixing 
Table 7.9  Argentina: Relative Prices and Real Wages (1986 = 100) 
Goods  Servicesd  Real Wageb 
1987  96.2  119.7  91.7 
1988  99.7  103.1  90.9 
1989  107.5  91.9  82.9 
1990  94.9  129.7  78.7 
1991  85.0  158.8  74.7 
199T  81.0  173.8  75.4 




tion is whether high domestic prices will now start affecting wages and from 
there the competitiveness of the international sector. 
Interestingly, the strong inflation impetus is entirely concentrated in the ser- 
vice sector (see fig. 7.5). The boom of  1991-92-28.9%  growth in industrial 
production between midyear 1990 and 1992-in  an economy that had not in- 
vested in capacity for many years must be the chief reason. What remains puz- 
zling, however, is the combination of (measured) declining real wages with an 
expanding economy. The ability to repatriate assets from abroad is an essential 
ingredient in sustaining that process. 
But the idea that competitiveness has not suffered because inflation has oc- 
curred predominantly in services is not right. Measures of  the effective real 
exchange rate have been prepared by the Banco Central Republica Argentina 
(BCRA) and are shown in table 7.10. These data show a drastic loss in compet- 
itiveness over the past few years. Moreover, detailed data reveal that there are 
no significant differences across sectors. Thus it is no surprise that the trade 








Fig. 7.5  Argentine CPI and WPI 
Table 7.10  Real Effective Exchange Rates (1986 = 100, trade weighted) 
Imports  Exports 
1987  101.6  108.2 
1988  101.4  104.9 
1989  120.5  118.9 
1990  74.8  85.3 
1991  52.1  65.0 
1992  54.6  58.9 
Source: Banco Central Republica Argentina 
'September. 
What next? If high consumer prices make their way  into wages and costs, 
the overvaluation is bound to spread to a sharp loss of competitiveness, a trade 
crisis, and a currency crisis. The beginning of that process is already visible. 
If so, another payments problem and with it expectations of devaluation and 
instability will emerge. For the time being, reflow of Argentine money  and 
investment in Argentina's assets by the rest of the world easily finance the trade 
deficit. But, of course, hot money can also go the other way. 
There are five ways of coping with the process under way. The first is to just 
let it run its course. Hang on to the convertibility  law both in respect to the 
level of the peso and the money supply rule and fully play the gold standard. 
If a loss in confidence occurs, this  will mean  capital flight, a tightening of 
credit, and a recession-the  rules of the game. 
Second, the government could hasten a recession by a sharp tightening of 
fiscal policy. That would crush demand and hence service sector inflation. This 
strategy has the advantage of keeping interest rates low, thus avoiding a new 
wave of  balance  sheet problems.  Under both  these options  the government 
would follow an uncharted, unprecedented path of maintaining the integrity of 236  Rudiger Dornbusch 
exchange rate commitments, That would be new in a country where most years, 
around December, confidence in the currency vanishes, and the lack of confi- 
dence soon becomes self-fulfilling. 
A third possibility is to abrogate the convertibility law (how can this be done 
expeditiously?),  devalue, and declare that this is the very last time. Nobody 
would be fooled, and the loss of confidence not only in the exchange rate but 
in the entire promise of reform and modernization might be vehement and de- 
structive. 
A fourth possibility is to depart marginally from the convertibility law in that 
one maintains the monetary rule but moves to a crawling peg without initial 
devaluation. This strategy would do little to reduce the initial overvaluation, 
and there would also be no mechanism to stabilize inflation. If money is endog- 
enous and the exchange rate is indexed to inflation,  with a minimal  lag, the 
rate of increase of inflation might be sluggish, but inflation itself could reach 
any level in time. 
Of these four options, following the rules, reinforced by a sharp fiscal tight- 
ening, is the strategy most likely to avoid destabilizing  inflation.  In another 
country one would add an appeal for a social pact. In Argentina that might be 
asking for the impossible. The basic fact is that the popularity of the Menem- 
Cavallo strategy derived from the image and the supergrowth. The bad news is 
that the country  now will go into far more disappointing  performance as it 
gradually builds up stability, institutions, and supply capacity just as Chile and 
Mexico have done. 
Another devaluation would break the confidence that has been built and risk 
an outbreak of another inflation wave. A sharp tightening of the budget and a 
slowdown of the premature  boom in demand will  maintain  confidence  and 
result in better performance in the long run. 
A fifth and final option goes even further than mere adherence to the convert- 
ibility law. In this option the government elimintates all domestic money and 
proceeds to complete dollarization.  The proposal  does nothing  to solve the 
problem of an accumulated lack of competitiveness, but it works forcefully on 
the credibility front.x The usual arguments about the loss of seigniorgage apply 
only in a mitigated fashion, since the country is de facto dollarized. The only 
issue is whether to proceed from 95% to 100% dollarization. 
7.7  Concluding Remarks 
Today Argentina needs to save and invest, not to spend and spend. Politically 
that message is unpopular. But Argentina is like Germany or Austria in 1920 
or in 1947-destroyed  economically and in need of  reconstruction; saving and 
productivity growth are essential, running down assets to finance a consump- 
tion boom is dead wrong. 
8. See Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, and Wolf (1990) for such a proposal. 237  Progress Report on Argentina 
Fig. 7.6  Investment/GDP ratio (%) 
Argentines have become far too optimistic in regard to the ease of modemiz- 
ing and recovering their lost position. The benchmark is not to return to 1980 
but rather to put the country in place to compete with Asia. For over a decade 
investment performance has been minimal (see fig. 7.6). In an economy where 
net investment has been negative, real wages cannot plausibly be the same as 
they were ten years ago. If Argentina succeeds, and it may well because the 
disillusionment  accompanying  the  last  inflation  was extreme, it will  take  a 
decade or more to stabilize and put in place a firm  basis for sustained growth. 
Chile, which has made the turn to sustained high growth, took fifteen years to 
get there. Mexico, which has not made it yet, has been at work for nearly a 
decade. Argentina is just starting, and already impatience is shining through. 
One hundred years ago, Argentina was stabilized and set off into a period of 
striking growth. The agenda today is the same, but the task is harder because 
agricultural endowments count for less and in industry Italian talent and flair 
just are no longer enough. 
Argentina now has come around to the view that inflation is deadly and that 
an inefficient state represents a weight that will ultimately crush prosperity. On 
the inflation front the country is wrestling  with adjustments and mechanisms 
to put in place lasting stability. On the modernization front the country is grap- 
pling with cleaning out the state and establishing efficient arrangements be- 
tween the federal government and the provinces. Argentina clearly has come 
around to the view that technocrats do better than populists. It has at the helm 
an immensely competent, pragmatic technocrat. Continuity and perseverance 
can put the country back in the race. As these efforts bear fruit, the need will 
emerge to open a discussion on a new role of the state in areas such as educa- 
tion and social welfare, which is now all but dismissed. 238  Rudiger Dornbusch 
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